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The main argument of the book under review is to show that one can find a pluralistic theory of shí 實 (= 
truth?) in the Lunheng (published 80 CE), “prepared” by a range of sources in the Warring States Period in 
China (479–221 BCE). This argument is not convincing because of small inconsistencies and major 
unsupported stipulations (see below). Nevertheless the book contains many perceptive and suggestive remarks 
concerning the texts discussed.  
The author starts by stipulating his main presupposition: Truth is a universal, foundational, abstract, 
informative, normative, shared concept in human thought (ix, xvi, 1, 5, 33-4, 74, 106, 161, 175, 183). It is a 
requisite for any intellectual activity (including philosophy, poetry and religion, but perhaps not music and 
painting). Different cultures/traditions will have different senses of this basic notion, but all traditions 
(implicitly) are committed to a “correspondence intuition” (6, 26, 29 33, 50, 52), explained in terms of “how 
things are” (x), “getting things right” (18); “grounding both the way things are and what we ought to do” (33, 64). 
Hence, it should not come as a surprise that “early Chinese thinkers must have had a conception of truth” 
(106). There is “a concept of truth at work in all early Chinese philosophical texts” (43), but not all of them 
construct “theories of truth” (as the title of the book might suggest). 
In chapter one, the author takes as his starting point discussions about truth in analytic philosophy, 
because that is what the author and most of his readers are familiar with (xv, 1-2). Analytic philosophy focuses 
on “linguistic entities with assertoric content” and that will be the focus of the author (2), although this 
approach is “getting it wrong” (35) in the sense of neglecting the multiple other senses of truth; about which 
the author makes a range of sympathetic comments, including a brief discussion of Shakespeare’s and the 
Aztecs’ notions of truth (35-7, 176-77). To avoid problems with the notions of sentence and proposition, the 
author chooses “statements” (yán 言) as truth-bearers (4, 10). 
In chapter one the author also addresses the work of the sinologists Chad Hansen and Hall and Ames, 
which he sees as his “opponents.” Hansen has argued for the past twenty years “not to use ‘true’ as a translation 
for any single word of Classical Chinese.” He is criticized by the author for not considering texts from the Han 
period (which include the Lunheng. Further, Hansen is “fixated on sentences” (15) and does not acknowledge 
that a míng 名 (name?) can be a statement having assertoric content and truth value (10-13, 51, 73, 80-82, 93-
94).  
Although the author criticizes the “overarching claims” of Hall and Ames “about a so-called ‘Chinese 
thought’” (25), he himself invokes “overarching themes in philosophical thought” (xvi), such as “about the 
concept of truth” (5). 
In chapters two to six the author discusses concepts and theories of truth he finds in the Analects of 
Confucius (551-479 BCE), Mozi (470-391 BCE), Mencius (372-289 BCE), Zhuangzi (369-286 BCE), Xunzi 
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(313-238 BCE), the Lunheng of Wang Chong (27-c.100), and others. The most common character suggestive of 
the implicit use of the concept of truth seems to be rán 然, starting in the Analects, where it is used as 
“affirmation of some statement or reiteration of some situation” (45). 
Shí as potentially a truth concept makes its appearance in the Mengzi (the book of Mencius). In the section 
on Mengzi (53-58), shí in 4B45 is given the meaning, “fruit(full)” (54).  But later on shí in the same passage is 
assigned the meaning “truth or essence” (147). 
The author engages in an extensive discussion of Mozi’s “three standards theory.” We should accord 
to the Mohists a “pragmatist” (18) or “pragmatic” (63) theory of truth, in which they "collapsed the distinction 
between the normative and descriptive" (66). 
In the chapter on Xunzi there is an extensive discussion of zhèngmíng 正名 (rectification of names) and 
ritual in terms of absolutism versus pluralism and realism versus conventionalism. The author claims (98): 
“Perhaps Xunzi’s greatest contribution to truth theory was his definition of the concept of shi” (understanding 
shí as reality, including events, thought, abstract entities). It is “necessary for a statement (or ming) to correspond 
with reality” (83). It would have been helpful to connect shí explicitly to truth, instead of stipulating that to 
“distinguish shi (actuality/reality)” is the same as “to grasp the truth” (98). 
The author argues that Zhuangzi is not a radical or thoroughgoing sceptic, perspectivist, or relativist, 
but a “semi-relativist or hybrid perspectivist” (116). Most human concepts are perspective-dependent (111), 
but some perspectives are “better” in being more effective, expansive, accurate (108), because there are 
universal “meta-level claims” (116). A statement is made true within a perspective by “perspective-independent 
statements that are presumably supposed to be true of the dao itself” (109). 
Shí is not mentioned in connection with Zhuangzi. Zhuangzi’s position is described as “anti-truth” 
(106), “concerning early Chinese views of truth, not Western views of truth” (106), challenging the “truth-seeking 
project itself” (104). It is not clear what these early Chinese views of truth are. The author notes correctly that, 
according to most commentators whose native language is English, the discussion of shìfēi in Zhuangzi’s Qiwulun 
is not “one concerning truth” (114), but one concerning standards of right/wrong. But, if this is so, it remains 
unclear what the author has in mind when he speaks of the “fledged-out theories of truth,” which Zhuangzi 
would be criticizing, or the “views concerning truth of early Confucians and Mohists” (106, emphasis added). 
Zhuangzi’s “perspectivist theory of truth in which only universally applicable or dao-correspondent 
statements are unproblematically true” (118) is refined and improved in the Huainanzi (before 139 BCE). On 
page 20 of the book under review it states that the Huainanzi evaluates yán in terms of shí and xū 虛, but in the 
full section on the Huainanzi (119-123), this is not mentioned anymore. Here it is explained how Zhuangzi’s 
“theory of truth” is developed, using the root/branches model. Different schools present different perspectives. 
The schools are the branches, dào is the root.  
In addition to the Huainanzi, the Shizi (c. 330 BCE) and the Lushi Chunqiu (around 239 BCE) support 
“convergence of the many perspectives [on the truth]” (126), instead of being exclusivist. All branches converge 
on the dào: a convergence of many partial perspectives. This may be called “essentialist pluralism” (as distinct 
from non-essentialistic pluralism associated with religious pluralism): all branches are necessary.  
Throughout the book, the author repeats many times that the summit (144) of a robust theory of shí 
can be found in the Lunheng (10, 16, 20, 52-53, 66, 71, 98, 99, 106). The author argues that shí 實 is what makes 
a statement either shì (是, for moral statements) or rán (然, for non-moral statements). (The treatment of the 
difference of shì and rán is disputable. Some scholars will say that the difference has to do with grammar, not 
with the fact/value distinction.) Therefore, shí is a second-order pluralistic property , "the property of having 
properties such that the truth-making description [rán or shì] is met” (161). Instead of the dào-based line in the 
Zhuangzi and Huainanzi, reality is understood in terms of shí instead of dào (83); presumably because “humans 
naturally seek” rán and shì (161). 
The author’s interpretation of the Lunheng is not convincing. Observing that shí is of central concern 
in the Lunheng does not yet entail that truth is a/the central concern. More importantly, it is announced several 
times (153, 156) that chapters in the Lunheng show the connection of shí with shìfēi and ránfǒu 然否, but nothing 
is forthcoming to support this. On page 153, it is announced two times that the Lunheng shows the connection 
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of shí and shìfēi and ránfǒu, but nothing is forthcoming. There is one citation (only) in which shìfēi and ránfǒu are 
used in the same passage (辯照是非之理，使後進曉見然否之分), repeated two times (145, 157), but 
nowhere “connected” to shí. The section labeled “Wang Chong’s theory of Truth” (145-150) describes in clear 
terms the proffered “pluralistic” theory, but without any support from the Lunheng. 
The author’s speculations about shí being a unifying second-order concept (149, 158, 160, 163-4) are 
suggestive, but such suggestions can also be made (and have been made) with respect to other texts or 
characters, as the author acknowledges (65).   
The author is correct to note that the character shí has a central role in the Lunheng (being used 647 
times according to the database of the Chinese Text Project), and so do shì and rán (occurring 719 and 635 
times respectively). However, the author provides no support for his suggestion that the Lunheng would be 
saying something about the relation of the “first-order” shìfēi and ránfǒu on the one hand, and the “second-order” 
shí and xū on the other. 
The book contains many perceptive remarks concerning the philosophers and texts covered. However, 
for this reader, the concepts and theories of truth presented are too much based on stipulation, speculation, 
and lack of clarity to be convincing. 
Proof reading could have been better. 
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